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asserted as a defense to a contract action. More particu-
larly in those cases where the court, in enforcing the con-
tract would enforce the precise conduct forbidden by the 
Sherman Act, the defense has been allowed. Continental Wall 
Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Son Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909). 
In this case, the enforcement of the sales by Keene Corpora-
tion to Grating, Inc. at the price determined by Keene 
would, in fact, be an enforcement of the precise conduct 
forbidden by the antitrust laws. 
Contrary to Keene's claim that defendants-appellants 
are playing "fast and loose" with the court, defendants-
appellants are, in fact, claiming that Keene, Harsco and 
other manufacturers of steel grating did fix the price at 
which the steel grating was sold to Grating, Inc. and that 
the district court's enforcement of the purchase orders and 
invoices involved in this case enforce the "precise conduct 
forbidden by the Sherman Act". Keene attempts to simplify 
and narrow the scope of the Sherman Act by apparently 
assuming that a price fixing agreement must necessarily 
entail a situation where manufacturers distributing goods to 
the same level of the market agreed to sell their products 
at the same price. Certainly the antitrust laws in affectino 
their remedial purposes are much broader in scope and reach 
conduct much more sophisticated. In the federal antitrust 
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case, Grating, Inc. is claiming that Keene and Harsco were 
manufacturers of steel grating, essentially controlling the 
distribution of steel grating in the Western United States. 
Keene Corporation was distributing steel grating through its 
representative, Grating, Inc. Grating, Inc. would purchase 
steel grating from Keene Corporation, take title thereto and 
redistribute it to its customers. Manufacturer Harsco, how-
ever, would compete directly with Grating by selling steel 
grating to the retail customers through its commissioned 
agent, Tom Giblin. Because Keene and Harsco were selling 
steel grating into the market at different levels (i.e., 
Keene selling to a distributor for resale; Harsco selling 
directly to the customer), a somewhat more sophisticated 
price fixing arrangement evolved. Keene and Harsco agreed 
to first fix the price at which Harsco through its commis-
sioned agent, Tom Giblin, and Keene through its independent 
distributor, Grating could resell steel grating. Obviously, 
Harsco would have no difficulty enforcing this price agree-
ment through its commissioned agent. Keene enforced the 
pricing requirement on Grating by threatening to cut Grating 
off, enter the market itself and undersell Grating driving 
it out of business. This arrangement was obviously beneficial 
beneficial to Harsco in that it allowed Harsco to divide the 
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market and price its products free of competition at a 
higher predetermined level. Keene not selling directly to 
the customer, would not directly benefit from this agreement 
standing alone. Keene Corporation benefitted by first 
fixing with Harsco Grating's resale price at an artificially 
high level then raisino the price at which Keene sold 
to Grating, Inc. to an artificially high level. This put 
Grating, Inc. into a price "squeeze". Keene Corporation in 
effect insured that Grating, Inc. would maintain at least 
50% of the market, but that its entire profitability would 
be passed onto Keene by selling to Grating, Inc. at inflated 
prices. When Grating, Inc. complained of the inordinate 
price hikes, Keene Corporation kept their scheme together by 
entering into agreements with other manufacturers of steel 
grating such as Harsco and Borden Manufacturing Company 
whereby these other manufacturers would refuse to sell steel 
grating to Grating, Inc. or would submit bids to Grating, 
Inc. at the same level or higher levels than Keene Corpora-
tion was currently selling to Grating, Inc. 
Although this is a brief summary of the nature of the 
claims Gratino, Inc. has brought against Keene and others in 
its federal antitrust action, each of these allegations are 
specifically set forth in the pleadings on file with the 
Federal District Court. 
-4-
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Based upon the foregoing allegations, it is clear that 
the artificially high prices at which Keene Corporation was 
selling steel grating to Grating, Inc. was an intrinsic part 
of the price fixing scheme between Harsco and Keene Corpora-
tion and to enforce sales at these artificially high prices 
would make the District Court a party to this scheme. 
Further, even if this court does not accept the fact that 
the price at which Keene Corporation sold the steel grating 
to Grating, Inc. standing alone was an integral part of the 
price fixing agreement, Grating, Inc. has specifically 
alleged in the federal case that Keene Corporation entered 
into agreements with other manufacturers, including Harsco 
and Borden Manufacturing Co., to either refuse to sell 
grating to Grating, Inc. or to submit quotes for the sale of 
grating at levels as high or higher than the price Keene 
Corporation was selling grating to Grating, Inc. This 
prevented Grating, Inc. from seeking any cheaper source of 
~pply. Certainly under these circumstances the sale of 
steel grating to Grating, Inc. were at levels which were 
fixed and determined by Keene Corporation in combination or 
conspiracy with the other manufacturers of steel grating 
controlling this geographic market and for the District 
Court to enforce those sales contracts at those artificially 
-5-
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high and fixed prices would make the District Court party to 
the illegal conduct. 
Contrary to Keene's argument in its brief, Grating, Inc. 15 
allegations against Keene in the federal antitrust case are 
almost identical to those presented in the Continental Wall 
Paper Co. case, supra and are completely distinguishable 
from the facts of Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959), the 
case principally relied upon by Keene. 
In Kelly, the petitioner purchased carloads of onions 
at a fair price and then jointly agreed with the sellers 
(respondents) not to deliver any of the onions on the 
futures market in order to "fix and create a false and 
fictitious price". There was no question that the sale 
price was fair and was not fixed. 
The petitioners tried to avoid payment on the ground 
the agreement to withhold delivery was in violation of the 
antitrust laws and illegal. 
In Kelly, the Supreme Court first specifically recog-
nized the rule set forth in the Continental Wall Paper case, 
supra: 
In any event, an analysis of the narrow 
scope in which the defense is allowed in respect 
of the Sherman Act indicates that the principle of 
distinction is not what the petitioner claims it 
to be. The leading case here in which the defense 
was allowed is Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis 
Voight & Sons Co. 212 US 227, 53 Led 486, 29 S Ct 
280, much relied on by petitioner. There the 
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Voight company had made purchases from Conti-
nental, a corporation which existed only as a 
selling agent for numerous wallpaper companies 
doing business as a pool and selling at prices, 
alleged to be excessive and unreasonable, fixed 
through the pool agreement. The Court was of the 
opinion that to give judgment for the excessive 
purchase price so fixed in favor of such a vendor 
would be to make the courts a party to the carrying 
out of one of the very restraints forbidden by the 
Sherman Act. 212 US at 261. Kelly at p. 520. 
Then the court distinguished the facts of the Kelly case 
from the Continental Wall Paper Co. case and ruled that the 
defense was unavailable. 
Accordingly, while the nondelivery agree-
ment between the parties could not be enforced 
by a court, if its unlawful character under the 
Sherman Act be assumed, it can hardly be said to 
enforce a violation of the Act to give legal 
effect to a completed sale of onions at a fair 
price. And while analysis in terms of "divisi-
bility" or some other verbal formula may well be 
circular, see 6 Corbin, Contracts, §1520, in any 
event, where, as here, a lawful sale for a fair 
consideration constitutes an intelligble economic 
transaction in itself, we do not think it inappro-
priate or violative of the intent of the parties 
to give it effect even though it furnished the 
occasion for a restrictive agreement of the sort 
here in question. CF. Cincinnati, P. B. S.& P. 
Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 US 179, 185, 50 Led 428, 
433, 26 S Ct 208. 
Affirmed. (Emphasis added). Kelly at p. 521. 
The law as set forth in Continental Wall Paper Co. v. 
Louis Voight & Son Co., supra, is still good law and under the 
facts of this case and Grating's allegations against Keene 
in the federal case is still controlling. The District Court 
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erred in dismissing as a matter of law appellants' defenses 
based upon violations of the Federal Antitrust Laws. 
DATED this /d day of m.~,// f=f- , 1979. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
d!k,71 ~~I~~-~;::_/ 
Richard K. trandall 
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